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3Motivation:
• Extensive reliance on IT systems makes electric power grids 
vulnerable to cyber threats
• Impacts could be massive: cyber attack on Ukraininan power 
grids in 2015 resulted in power outage for 225 000 customers 
lasting up to six hours
Objective: 
Selection of the optimal portfolios of security measures that 
reduce the susceptibility of power grids to cyber attacks.
Introduction
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4Standard practice: a cyber threat scenario 
(Attack tree) as basic unit of analysis
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Source: Lee, A., 2015. Analysis of selected electric sector high risk failure
scenarios. National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource
(NESCOR) Technical Working Group 1.
5Standard practice: impact assessment
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• 14 impact criteria 
(dimensions)
• Score values in set 
{0, 1, 3, 9}
• Composite impact 
score σ𝑘=1
14 𝐼𝑆𝑘
Source:
Lee, A., 2015. Electric sector failure 
scenarios and impact analyses.
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity 
Organization Resource
(NESCOR) Technical Working Group 1.
6Standard practice: likelihood assessment
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• 5 impact criteria
• Score values in set 
{0, 1, 3, 9}
• Composite 
likelihood score
σ𝑗=1
5 𝐿𝑆𝑗
Source:
Lee, A., 2015. Electric sector failure 
scenarios and impact analyses.
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity 
Organization Resource
(NESCOR) Technical Working Group 1.
Apply security measures to 
reduce risk of cyber threat 
scenario
Apply security measures to 
reduce risk of cyber threat 
scenarios
Is budget 
depleted?
Done!
Yes
No
Composite likelihood score σ𝑗=1
5 𝐿𝑆𝑗
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Standard practice: threats prioritization
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Analysis of individual threat 
scenarios
Integrated analysis of 
multiple threat scenarios
Aggregated composite 
impact score
Multiple impact dimensions
Standard practice Our framework
Likelihood score
Probabilisic model of cyber 
attacks
9Security issues: 
• AMI introduces large number of devices in widely dispersed and 
potentially insecure customers sites
• AMI allows for two-way communication with traditionally self-
contained power systems.
Focus:
• 8 cyber threat scenarios with the highest priority for AMI systems
• 7 relevant impact dimensions considered (out of total 14 impact 
criteria considered in standard approach).
Case study: improving security of 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
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From individual attack graphs to 
integrated picture
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”Reverse engineering of AMI 
equipment
allows unauthorized mass control”
”Invalid disconnect messages 
to meters impact customers 
and utility”
Graph of integrated attack scenarios
11, date
Chance nodes: events in 
cyber threat scenarios
Impact nodes: dimensions 
of cyberattack impacts
Arcs: causal dependencies 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment with 
Bayesian Network
Turning integrated attack graph into a Bayesian Network:
• Attach a conditional probability table (CPT) to each node to 
represent occurance probabilities of corresponding event given the 
state of nodes on which it directly depends
• CPTs can be derived from: structure of attack graph (0-1 logical 
links), historical observations or expert judgements 
For each impact dimension we define risk as:
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐼 = expected impact I = ෍
𝑖∈𝐼𝐿
𝑖 × 𝑃(𝐼 = 𝑖)
Where 𝐼𝐿 is the set of possible levels of impact 𝐼.
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Options for risk reduction
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Index Security measure
1 Train personnel on possible paths for infection
2 Maintain patches and anti-virus
3 Test for malware before connection
4 Implement configuration management
5 Verify all firewall changes
6 Require intrusion detection and prevention
7 Require authentication to access firewall
8 Conduct penetration testing periodically
9 Train personnel on social engineering attacks
10 Strong passwords
11 Encrypt communication paths
Index Security measure
12 Protect against replay
13 Strong security questions
14 Require multi-factor authentication
15 Use a token with PIN
16 Limit individuals with privilege
17 Isolate network
18 Enforce restrictive firewall rules
19 Require authentication to access network
20 Remove unsecure development features
21 Include credentials in equipment design
22 Configure for least functionality
• Each security measure is applied to a specific chance node
15, date
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• Each security measure is applied to a specific chance node
• It reduces the occurance probability of the event a node represents 
• Bayesian Networks enable probability update on the cascading 
events of the cyber threat scenarios.
Options for risk reduction
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12 Protect against replay
13 Strong security questions
14 Require multi-factor authentication
15 Use a token with PIN
16 Limit individuals with privilege
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18 Enforce restrictive firewall rules
19 Require authentication to access network
20 Remove unsecure development features
21 Include credentials in equipment design
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• A portfolio is a combintion of security measures, represented by a 
binary 𝑧 such that 𝑧𝑎 = 1 iff security measure 𝑎 belongs to the 
portfolio. 
• A portfolio must satisfy budget and technical constraints:
෍
𝑎
𝒛𝑎 ∙ 𝒄𝑎 ≤ 𝐵
෍
𝑠
ℙ[𝑋 = 𝑠|𝒛] ≤ 𝜀
𝒛𝑎′ + 𝒛𝑎′′ ≤ 1
𝒛𝑎′ − 𝒛𝑎′′ = 0
Budget
Risk acceptability
Mutually exclusive
Mutually inclusive
Portfolio of security measures
Goal: to find Pareto-optimal portfolios
A portfolio is Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible portfolio that 
further reduces the risks in any of impact dimesnion 𝐼𝑘 without 
increasing the risk in any other dimension
𝒛∗ ≻ 𝒛 ↔ ቊ
𝑅[𝐼𝑘](𝒛
∗) ≤ 𝑅[𝐼𝑘](𝒛) for all 𝑘
𝑅 𝐼𝑘 𝒛
∗ < 𝑅[𝐼𝑘](𝒛) for some 𝑘
≻
⊁
Risk dimension 1
Risk dimension 2
Pareto-optimal solutions
Dominance relations
⊁
13
Risk-based Selection of Mitigation Strategies for Cybersecurity of Electric Power Systems
20
Input:
• Set of security measures
• Budget and technical constraints
Method: Implicit enumeration algorithm (Mancuso et al. 2019)
• Computationally efficient: intelligent search over 2𝑁 portfolios, 
explores only subspace containing good candidates for Pareto-
optimal portfolios
• Scalability: time consuming for large portfolios of security 
measures (>40) 
Computing the set of Pareto-optimal 
portfolios (Pareto front)
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Risk profiles (envelope of Pareto front)
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Picking a Pareto-optimal portfolio
• Set of Pareto optimal portfolios is large
• Possible guidance offered by the core index (Liesiö et al. 2008)
𝐶𝐼 𝑎 =
No. of Pareto − optimal portfolios containing 𝑎
No. of all Pareto − optimal portfolios
• Interpretation: high 𝐶𝐼(𝑎) implies that 𝑎 belongs to the core i.e., 
subset of measures shared by all Pareto-optimal portfolios (for 
given constraints).
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Core index map for selection of security 
measures
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Summary
• Quantitative extension of qualitative standard practice
• Systemic perspective: 
o Different threat scenarios analysed jointly
o Different risk dimensions represented explicitly
o Taking advantage of synergies between mitigation actions
• Probabilistic approach:
o Natural representation of likelihoods, framework for rigorous likelihood calculus 
o Bayesian Network:
▪ Probabilistic model of cascading events leading to successful cyber attacks
▪ Conditional probabilities: tractable and (relatively) easy to estimate 
▪ Allow to calculate contribution of portfolios of security measures to reduction of risks
• Risks understood as expected impacts
• Optimization
o Multi-objective
o Representation of budget and technical constraints
o Efficient algorithm of computing the set of Pareto-optimal portfolios of mitigation 
actions
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Thank you for your attention!
Questions?
Piotr Żebrowski
IIASA, Advanced Systems Analysis program
zebrowsk@iiasa.ac.at
Optimization algorithm
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The selection of Pareto optimal portfolios is performed 
through an implicit enumeration algorithm.
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Budget=100
Cost vector
Saving 27 portfolio evaluations!
Saving 24 portfolio evaluations!0
